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The Defendants/Appellants Jay Timmons & Associates, Jay Timmons, and 
Marshall McDaniel ("Defendants") submit the following petition for a rehearing. 
ISSUE PRESENTED BY PETITION 
Does this Court have discretion to deny the Defendants attorney's fees specifically 
provided for in the restrictive covenants at issue in this matter? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In footnote 6 concluding the opinion rendered in this matter, the Court indicated 
that because it was reversing the trial court's decision in favor of the Plaintiffs, it was also 
reversing the award of attorney's fees in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court indicated, however, 
that each side would bear its own litigation expenses. Defendants, who have prevailed in 
this matter, cannot escape the conclusion that the Court's ruling prevents the recovery of 
attorney's fees incurred by them both at trial and on appeal. Defendants respectfully 
submit that under Utah law, the Defendants are entitled as a matter of law to reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in the trial court and on appeal. Accordingly, Defendants 
respectfully request that the Court revise footnote six to provide for the recovery of 
attorney's fees by the Defendants both in the trial court and on appeal, and remand to 
the trial court for a determination of what amount of fees is reasonable in this case. 
FACTS 
Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for alleged violations of the provisions of the 
recorded Evergreen Subdivision Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
("CC&Rs"). The case was tried to a jury, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
Defendants on every allegation. The judge subsequently determined that the jury verdict 
was advisory. While he agreed with the jury that the Defendants did not violate certain 
provisions of the CC&R's, be concluded that other provisions of the CC&Rs were 
violated. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on certain allegations and 
awarded the Plaintiffs $35,000.00 in attorney's fees. 
On appeal, this Court concluded that the judge erred as a matter of law in 
deeming the jury verdict to be advisory and non-binding. The Court reversed and 
remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with the jury verdict. The Court's decision 
has the undisputed effect of making the Defendants the prevailing party on every issue. 
Notwithstanding, the Court ruled that the Defendants are not entitled to recover the 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter, despite the fact that the CC&R's at 
issue expressly provide that M[a]ny judgment rendered in any action or proceeding 
pursuant hereto shall include a sum for attorney's fees in an amount as the court shall 
deem reasonable, in favor of the prevailing party." 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AS A MATTER OF LAW 
While footnote 6 of the Court's opinion appears to conclude that this Court has 
discretion to refuse to award attorney's fees provided by contract to a prevailing party, the 
Defendants respectfully suggest that no such discretion exists when fees are provided for 
by contract rather than statute. Indeed, Utah case law establishes that the recovery of 
fees when provided for by contract is a matter of legal right. 
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I Jtah has adc pted the vieu that a* t< n \ tey's fees t n ( *v U led foi t:>) contract, such as 
here, are recoverable a^  a matter pt" ^ w an.i .-.MITIV M.* n. .1 s i\»-- discretion to deny such an 
award.1 .• ^unuc- . 840 jp.za , . i<u.. A K , - J92), this court declared: 
While courts may, in some, situations, award attorney fees on an 
equitable basis attorney's fees, when awarded as allowed by law; are 
• awarded as a matter of legal right. 
One SUCH ins,i. 
cases, the court does ;.*,;
 r^^w.. .• • • t * • * 
attorney's fees that v has when fashioning equitable remedies. , applying * 
statute which allows the discretionarv award of such lees 
Id. at 809 (citations, quotations and footnote omitted) The Saum iers : :»i 11: t conch ided . 
that "provisions in written contracts providing for attorney's fees should ordinarily be 
1 
SimilarK. the I tah Supreme Court has also held that if "reasonable fees are 
State Bunk \ Bracken. 764 P,2d 985, 991 (I tali W88) (emphasis addtv - Fhe Dixie State 
Bank court coiuiuu^ \u^ .. ;,.;*, u,u,i "commits iega* LUO>
 r. .iw.t,^ k^s man a 
reasonable fee to . [a] successful litigant" when provided for by contract. Id. at 991. 
Undeniably, if failure to award less than reasonable attorney's fees constitutes a "mistake 
of law", it is certainly an eve n more egregioi is "i nistake of la ., " t :> i: efi ise to pei mit the 
recovery of attorney's fees altogether. In short, Defendants are entitled to their attorney's 
fees as a matte ,i of la ii ill Jtah. • . . ' ; ' ' " . • . , : ... ..-. 
Courts have held that provisions in restrictive covenants providing for the recovery of 
attorneys fees are contractual in nature and have applied the rules applicable to contractual 
provisions. See, e.g.,Amoco Realty Company v. Montalbano, 478 N.E.2d 860,865-866 (IlLApp. 
2d. 1985). Utah courts have held that restrictive covenants are contracts and should be 
interpreted and treated as such. See Cecala -• /'\>r/ey, 764 P.2d 643, 644 (Utfch App. 1988). 
In addition, the Court should allow Defendants to also recover their fees on 
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly declared: 
We therefore adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment of 
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to 
enforce the contract, and overrule Swain and Downey State Bank insofar as 
they may be to the contrary. 
Management Services, Inc. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) 
(emphasis added); see also, Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah App. 1989). 
Thus, it is clear that Defendants are entitled to recover not only reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred in the trial court, but also reasonable fees expended on appeal. In the 
words of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, the Defendants are entitled to recover 
their attorney's fees in this case as a "matter of legal right" and to deny them fees in a 
reasonable amount constitutes a "mistake of law." Accordingly, this court should revise 
footnote 6 and remand this case to the trial court with direction to determine reasonable 
fees incurred by the Defendant at trial and on appeal. 
II. NO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST THAT WOULD 
JUSTIFY REFUSAL TO ENFORCE THE CLEAR PROVISION OF 
THE CC&R'S PROVIDING FOR RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In Cobabe, this court noted in dicta that in "extraordinary circumstances" some 
courts have declined to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in spite of an 
enforceable contractual provision. Id. at 836 n.3. Notwithstanding its footnote 3, the 
Cobabe court reversed the trial court's denial of fees based on a contractual provision. 
The court gave three examples of cases constituting extraordinary circumstances. The 
first, Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976), the only Utah case Defendants have 
- 4 -
located in which a court refused to award any fees despite an enforceable contractual 
provision, involved an instance in which the prevailing Plaintiff had already been awarded 
ovei $12,000 as a forfeiture under a real estate purchase contract. Id. The:, coi irt • 
indicated that because of the forfeiture involved, it would uphol 3 -;- - .*• 
determination to deny attorney's fees, Note, however, that the trial court was permitted 
superseded by the Saunders and Alarum >«< Senutw decisions. V\:;K:. . Iearl\ hold that 
The second case mentioned bv rhr* Cnhahe co\\n ^ ( able Marin** b i • ; 7 "rust 
Me II ,632 1 .2d 1344 (5tl i Cii 19*- , *-. • uvolvc* a^ituai-Wi wneie it riamui 
prevailed but had rejected settlement offers substantially equal to the ultimate judgment. 
The third case, United States v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 588 F.2d 259 (9th Ci ." ^ . 
i ' - igdoing 1: ;; bot'l i j : ai ties I I n is. 1:1 le • cas = s i i Dted ii :i • Heft ? 1: •; 1:1 l e • 
involved primarily refusals to allow Plaintiffs to recover fees because such a result would 
Villi), in > ui in iir 1  i 1 ML i i III ii, in 11 ii Defend.ml and IlktiiiiM minimi inn Itim p.ul nl IIII Pkuiililf 
indicated that the fees were unnecessarily incurred. 
•'.' I I ere, by contrast, uw ; .K^ ^...;.;.. :... . *...v.^... „ ...... '.L Uii, .idants are entitled 
to their attorney's fees, Th^ Defendants in this case did absolutely nothing that would 
justify denial of their right to attorney's fees. ' I hey were sued and forced to ina lr 
expenses to defend themselves against the Plaintiffs' attack. They ultimately prevailed on 
every issue, and should not be forced to bear their attorney's fees in this matter. It is one 
thin* e 
-5 -
another to deny prevailing defendants, forced to retain counsel to defend themselves, 
their fees, particularly when the CC&R's Plaintiffs sue under clearly provide that the 
prevailing party shall recover its attorney's fees in an action to enforce the CC&R's. 
Article VI, Section 1(a) of the CC&R's provides: 
Breach of any of the covenants contained in this Declaration and the 
continuation of any such breach may be enjoined, by the Declarant, any 
Owner or by the Architectural Committee. Any judgment rendered in any 
action or proceeding pursuant hereto shall include a sum for attorney's fees 
in an amount as the court shall deem reasonable, in favor of the prevailing 
party .... 
It is beyond dispute that this action was one to enforce the CC&R's and that the 
Defendants were the prevailing party. Plaintiffs were well aware of the attorney's fees 
provision when they decided to file a lawsuit. Notwithstanding, they determined to press 
forward with litigation. Indeed, Plaintiffs made a request for and were awarded attorney's 
fees based on the provision in the by the trial court CC&R's. No extraordinary 
circumstances exist which justify a denial of the Appellant's attorney's fees in this case.2 
CONCLUSION 
Because it is a mistake of law to refuse to award attorney's fees provided for by 
contract, this Court should revise footnote 6 of its opinion and remand to the trial court 
2
 The only "extraordinary circumstance" in this case appears to be that it was a close case 
on the evidence. The jury decided the case one way, the judge another. However, close 
cases cannot constitute extraordinary circumstances. To so conclude would render 
contractual attorney's fees provisions a nullity in virtually all cases that go to trial. Virtually 
every case that proceeds to trial is a close case-otherwise it would have settled or been 
dismissed. Thus, the Court here should not deny Defendants' request because the case may 
have been close. The establishment of such a precedent will only encourage protracted 
battles over attorney's fees. 
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for a determination of reasonable fees incurred by the Defendants at trial and on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ £ day of June, 1995. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Paul H^Matthew^ 
Randy W. Austin 
Attorneys for Defebdcints-Appellants 
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